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range  of   services  but   restricted  vulnerabilities,  a  hacker  may  be   forced  to  direct   their  attacks   to   the only  
available exploits. This research discusses the deployment of a honeynet configured with a deceptive TELNET  




















































the Cisco IOS platforms  .  The Cisco Simple Network Management Protocol   (SNMP) exploit   for  gaining a 
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whether   they   followed   the   predetermined   pathway   of   deception   to   the   intended   TELNET   and   TFTP 
















from data  mining  and  analysing   the  content  of   information.  The  tool   is  able   to  visually  display   identified 
conceptual themes, their attributes and the interrelationships between concepts. The process of content analysis 
integrates a systematic approach to identifying content categories from text using explicit coding rules . The 
combined hand trace, frequency analysis  and content analyses methods were used to identify  if   the hackers 


















































































Frequency statistics  generated  by SPSS  for   the  destination   IP  addresses  within   the  honeynet   that  hacker  1 
interacted with showed that host  172.16.3.1  received the most network packets. This host was the  Cisco  
7206 router  (IOS 11.1(17)  containing  the TELNET vulnerability  and  its   frequency was 61,038 occurrences. 
Hacker 1 interacted with three other hosts within the honeynet, which were 172.16.1.1,  172.16.1.2 and 












66,  which was  the next  highest   frequency detected,   for   the destination IP address  192.168.1.1.  This  IP 
address  was   the   intended   host   for   the   hacker   to   initiate   the   TFTP   connection   and   download   the   router 
configuration file. Table 1 also indicated that the highest frequency for the protocols used by hacker 1 was TCP.
Table 1 Protocol frequencies per destination IP address for hacker 1
SOURCE IP DESTINATION IP PROTOCOL FREQUENCY
192.168.1.2 172.16.1.1 ICMP 97
  TCP 5,110
  TELNET 53
  HTTP 1
  UDP 21
 172.16.1.2 ICMP 14
  TCP 6,809
  TELNET 37
  UDP 8
 172.16.2.1 ICMP 23
  TCP 1
 172.16.3.1 ICMP 1,149
  TCP 56,638
  TELNET 189
  TFTP 3,060
  UDP 2
 192.168.1.1 ICMP 2,260
  TFTP 66
Figure 3 shows a conceptual map of hacker 1’s exploit. The large circles identify major concepts such as the 
source   and   destination   IP   address  192.168.1.2  as  Leximancer  detected   that   IP   address  occurring  most 
frequently in the log file. Other major concepts identified include the protocol TFTP and the attributes that were 
located in close proximity of that protocol. These attributes are shown in the large red box and include the words 



















































































































































































































was   the  172.16.3.1  host  with  12,533  occurrences.  The  host  172.16.3.2  received   the   second  highest 
frequency with 7,706 occurrences followed by the 192.168.1.1 host with 6,884 occurrences.
In  Table   2,   the   three   destination   IP   addresses   that   hacker   2   interacted  with   using   the   source   IP   address 
192.168.1.10 is shown. These destination IP addresses corroborate with the destination IP addresses within 
the   honeynet   of   the   hand   traced   attack   vector.   From   the   source   IP   address  192.168.1.2,   the   protocol 
frequencies for the destination IP address 172.16.3.1 show TELNET with 1,068 occurrences, which was the 
highest   occurrence   of  TELNET activity   for   any   destination   IP   address.  The  TFTP  protocol   frequency   for 
destination IP addresses 172.16.3.1 and 192.168.1.1 show 15 and 24 occurrences respectively. Table 2 
also shows a TELNET frequency of 943 for the destination IP address 172.16.3.1 when using the source IP 
address  192.168.1.11,  which  was  before  hacker  2   spoofed  their   IP address   to  192.168.1.2.  All   the 
protocol frequencies for each destination IP address could not be shown as the table was too large. However, the 
table  provided   the  protocol   frequencies   for   the  destination   IP   addresses  which  SPSS  detected  as   the  most 
frequently visited across all source IP addresses for hacker 2.
SOURCE IP DESTINATION IP PROTOCOL FREQUENCY
192.168.1.10 172.16.1.1 ICMP 4
  TCP 3,362
  TELNET 1
 172.16.1.2 ICMP 1
  TCP 1,675
 192.168.1.1 ICMP 5
  TCP 6,658
192.168.1.2 172.16.3.1 ICMP 2
  TCP 5,364
  TELNET 1,086
  UDP 2
  TFTP 15
 192.168.1.1 ICMP 10
  TCP 6
  TFTP 24
192.168.1.11 172.16.3.1 ICMP 3
  TCP 5,112
  TELNET 943
Table 2 Protocol frequencies per destination IP address for hacker 2
Figures 5 and 6 show conceptual maps that Leximancer generated from the honeynet’s log file of hacker 2’s 
attack.   In Figure  5,   the  red box highlights   the  main  concept which was  the  TFTP protocol.  The attributes 
detected   by   Leximancer   that   were   associated   with   the   TFTP   protocol   included  router_config, 
Read_Request, Data_Packet, and Transfer in close proximity to one another. In Figure 6, the red box 
















































































































































































Hacker   3   performed   a   series   of   TCP   ACK   and   ICMP   PING   requests   on   the  172.16.1.0/24, 


























SOURCE IP DESTINATION IP PROTOCOL FREQUENCY
192.168.1.100 172.16.3.1 ICMP 92
  TCP 18,846
  TELNET 659
  IP 888
  UDP 8
 172.16.3.2 ICMP 43
  TCP 8,595
 192.168.1.1 ICMP 66






TFTP protocols  were detected  for   the  192.168.1.1  host  or   the  172.16.3.1  host.  Figure  8   shows  the 
conceptual  mapping  of  hacker  3’s  attack.   In   the  red box,   the  attributes  Telnet_Data  and destination  IP 



















The SPSS frequency analysis of  the honeynet’s  log file from hacker 4 showed that all   the hosts  within the 
honeynet   received   network   packets   from   hacker   4.   The   hosts   detected   with   the   highest   frequency   was 
172.16.1.2 with 88,777 occurrences,  172.16.5.3 with 63,590 occurrences, followed by  172.16.3.1 




SOURCE IP DESTINATION IP PROTOCOL FREQUENCY
192.168.1.100 192.168.1.1 ICMP 1
192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 TFTP 7
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in   the   honeynet   that   were   networking   infrastructure.   These   hosts   included   the  Cisco   WGB350   802.11b  
WorkGroup Bridge on IP address 172.16.1.2, the DSL Router: Flowpoint 144/22XX v.3.0.0 or SpeedStream  
5851   v4.0.5.1  on   IP   address  172.16.1.1  and   the  Cisco   7206   router   (IOS   11.1(17)  on   IP   address 










TELNET and TFTP exploits.  When combined with  the hand  trace analysis  and frequency statistics,   it  was 
deduced that hacker 1 was deceived by the honeynet and was directed to exploit the intended TELNET and 
TFTP vulnerabilities.




the  192.168.1.1  host,   and   hosts   in   the  172.16.1.0/24,  172.16.3.0/24,  172.16.4.0/24  and 
172.16.5.0/24 networks.


















sent   packets   which   the   log   file   recorded   as   IP   UNKNOWN   payloads   to   both   the  172.16.3.1  and 












this hacker conducted large amounts of scanning using multiple  tools  to verify their results.  This  technique 
resulted in protocol frequencies higher than the previous three hackers. Hacker 4 was able to detect the TELNET 










































potential   weakness   of   the   router   in   that   TFTP   connections   were   permitted   from   a   single   IP   address. 
Subsequently, three out of the four hackers were directed and deceived by the honeynet into pursuing the TFTP 
exploit.





ability to exploit  vulnerabilities,   the honeynet could guide the hacker to the intended deception without  the 
hacker’s knowledge that they were being controlled. The outcome of the research indicated that hacker’s may be 
directed and deceived by a honeynet through predetermined network deception at the TCP/IP level.
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